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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

UNITED STATES v. RICHEY:
DISCLOSURE OF TAX
INFORMATION BY FORMER IRS
AGENT NOT PROTECTED BY
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Richey,! the Ninth Circuit held that the
disclosure by a former Internal Revenue Service agent of confidential tax information in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7213 2
was not speech worthy of first amendmentS protection even
though it touched upon a matter of public concern.4
1. 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991) (per O'Scannlain, J., with whom Wright, J. joins;
Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) provides:
(a) Returns and return information.
(l)Federal employees and other persons. It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States,
... or any former officer or employee, willfully to disclose
to any person, except as authorized in this title, any
return or return information (as defined in section
6103(b». Any violation of this paragraph shall be a felony
punishable upon conviction by a fine in any amount not
exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment of not more than 5
years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution,
and if such offense is committed by any officer or employee of the United States, he shall, in addition to any other
punishment, be dismissed from office or discharged from
employment upon conviction for such offense.
Section 7213(a) imposes criminal penalties for violation of the confidentiality requirements spelled out in detail in section 6103, discussed infra. Therefore case law defining what comprises a disclosure, under what circumstances a disclosure may be
authorized. and related matters centers around interpretation of section 6103. There
have been no criminal prosecutions under section 7213(a) heretofore.
3. U.S. CONST. amend I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.·
4. Richey, 924 F.2d at 863. For a discussion of "public concern," see, n.53 infra,
and accompanying text.
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The court ruled that the government's compelling interest in
maintaining a workable tax systemS outweighed Richey's personal
interest in having an unbiased judge preside at his trial,6 his
interest in commenting on matters of public concern,7 and the public interest in being informed about the operation of the courts. 8
The Ninth Circuit's opinion balanced Richey's right to
speak on matters of public concern under the first amendment against the government interest in the confidentiality of
tax returns and tax return information expressed in 28 U.S.C ..
§ 7213. This note measures that opinion against the background of section 6103, the statute upon which section 7213
depends, and against recent Supreme Court decisions scrutinizing statutes that purport to limit a speaker's right to speak
on matters of public interest.
FACTS

Lawrence Richey, a retired Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
agent with 25 years of service, was indicted in 1985 for participation in a tax shelter scheme. 9 After several trials and
appeals,t° a jury found him guilty of conspiracy and aiding
and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns. ll Judge
5. [d. at 862.

6. [d. See also 28 U.S.C. § 455, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party ...
7. Richey, 924 F.2d at 860.
8. [d.
9. [d. at 858. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1989)(unpublished

memorandum decision) Richey was hired to prepare the tax returns of persons participating in "payroll discount" or "consulting services" tax shelters subsequently ruled
by the IRS to have been set up to evade taxes. Memorandum decision at 2 and 10. See
also, United States v. Russell, 804 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 1986).
10. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1 Proceedings
docket. Judgment filed July 6, 1987. This document makes reference to several related proceedings. Richey was one of many defendants involved in the original government prosecution. He tried unsuccessfully to get his case as hired tax preparer
separated from the cases against the initiators of the scheme.
11. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1 Filed July
6, 1987. JUDGMENT AND PROBATION/COMMITMENT ORDER "Finding and
Judgment. Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offenses of Count 1 Conspiracy; in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371; and Counts 13-26, inclusive, - Aiding and
Assisting in the preparation of False Tax Returns; in violation of26 U.S.C. 7206 (2)."
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Alan A. McDonald, who had presided over the last of these trials, sentenced Richey to probation with special conditions. 12
Condition (b), "Defendant shall abstain from making any
derogatory remarks against the Government of the United
States," drew the attention of the local press, television, and
radio stations. Three newsmen contacted Richey for comment
on the gag order.18 In response to questions by a reporter for the
Spokesman-Review and Spokane Chronicle, Richey speculated that Judge McDonald, whom he had audited and assessed
for additional tax fifteen years earlier, might have wanted
"retribution."14 In a videotaped interview with KNDO TV,
Richey stated in response to a question as to why he thought
Judge McDonald had imposed the restraint, "I thought it was
rather malicious. I may have rubbed him the wrong way in my
frequent letters to the editors; I don't know. I also remember
interviewing him as an agent about fifteen years ago and
assessing some additional tax ... "16
For these statements, Richey was charged with and convicted of three felony counts of unauthorized disclosure of tax
return information in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7213. 16 Richeis
12. Richey was sentenced to three years imprisonment on each count, for a
total of 45 years. ld. The sentencing order provided:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED execution of the sentences as to
imprisonment, only, hereby imposed are [sic] suspended
and the Defendant is placed on probation for a period of
five years, with the following special conditions of probation:
(a) Defendant shall continue to file timely tax returns and
pay all tax due and owing to the United States;
(b) Defendant shall abstain from making any derogatory
statements against the Government of the United States;
(c) The Defendant shall refrain from associating with
anyone who advocates non-payment of taxes justly due;
and
(d) Defendant shall perform 250 hours of community service, at the direction of the probation officer.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, LAWRENCE
M. RICHEY, shall pay one-third the costs of prosecution
(emphasis added).
13. Richey, 924 F.2d at 858.
14. ld. Richey's remarks were printed on the front page of the SpokesmanReview and Spokane Chronicle newspapers on October 7, 1987. That day, the news
director of the Yakima radio station called Richey and asked him to verifY that he had
audited McDonald. Richey confirmed the audit, but refused to reveal the year or outcome. This information was broadcast four times.ld. at 864. The videotaped interview
was initiated that day and broadcast two months later. ld.
15. ld. at 864. Nothing in the record indicates the contents of his frequent letters to the editor.
16. U.S.D.C. Eastern District of Washington, CR-88-217-S. Judge Harry L.
Hupp presided over the non-jury trial, and sentenced Richey to supervised probation
for a period of three years. Judgment filed Nov. 3, 1988.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 13

146

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:143

appeal to the Ninth Circuit of this conviction raised three
issues, principally arguing that Richey's disclosure of tax
information was protected by the first amendment, and that his
indictment should have been dismissed. 17
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

STATUTES PURPORTING TO LIMIT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

When a statute is challenged as an impermissible interference with rights under the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court will weigh the individual's constitutional right against
the state interest asserted. IS "When a substantial claim of an
abridgement of [a right] is advanced, the presumption of validity that belongs to an exercise of state power must not [prevent]
close examination of the merits of the controversy.-19 Whether
the statute is a state law or a law passed by Congress, the Court
will conduct this examination. 20
In NAACP u. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court stated the
constitutional limitation where the government asserts a
In the meantime, since Richey's comments to the press violated the condition of
probation forbidding derogatory statements against the Government, Richey's probation for his prior convictions under 18 U.S.C. 371 and 26 U.S.C. 7206(c) was
revoked, and he was sentenced by another judge to a new probationary term which did
not contain that condition. Richey, 924 F.2d at 864.
17. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991).
"1. Whether the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss; 2. Whether the
trial court should have granted the motion for removal of counsel; 3. Whether Appellant's
disclosure of his audit of his trial judge was protected by the First Amendment.Richey's motion for removal of counsel was based on an erroneous reading of section 7213 in which Richey's attorney suggests that the U.S. Attorney prosecuting the
case should be removed since he disclosed the amount of tax paid and the tax years
involved in Judge McDonald's audit.ld. at 7.
18. In recent decades the Supreme Court has elaborated on the interpretation
of the first amendment in many areas. We are here concerned with a challenge to a
statute which places a content restriction on speech. E.g. Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829 (1978).
19. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 293 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
20. Although most recent cases reaching the Court have challenged state
statutes, e.g., Riley v. Nat'1. Fed'n. of Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), concerning the
North Carolina Charitable Solicitations Act, many cases during World War I and during the 1950's challenged federal statutes aimed at punishing subversive activity, e.g.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), wherein Justice Holmes set forth the
framework by which to measure the words against the statute; "The question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. - Id. at 52.
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substantial interest in regulating activity protected by the
first amendment. 21 While recognizing that governmental regulation having an incidental effect on first amendment freedoms may be permitted in certain narrowly defined
instances,22 the Court held that the state may not employ
"means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."23 The NAACP
boycott, which violated Mississippi anti-boycott statutes, was
a protected speech activity insofar as it was non-violent. 24 The
Court reasoned that the presence of activity protected by the
first amendment demands "precision of regulation" where the
state seeks to impose liability.25
In 1980, in Consolidation Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n.,
the Supreme Court reviewed the theories offered to justify state
regulation of protected speech activity.26 Employing an analytical framework which has since guided the court in a line of cases
challenging statutes and regulations burdening speech, the
court examined the Public Service Commission order banning
certain bill inserts to see ifit was a) a reasonable time, place or
manner restriction; b) a narrowly tailored means of serving a
compelling state interest; or c) a permissible subject matter
regulation. 27 The court found that the order was none of these,
21. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912, 916 (1982), (quoting
the "precision of regulation" standard from NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438
(1963) and other earlier cases). In Claiborne, the Mississippi Supreme Court had held
the NAACP liable and awarded damages to the white merchants of Claiborne County
for economic losses incurred over a seven year period as a result of a civil rights boycott launched at an NAACP meeting. The Supreme Court found that Mississippi
could not hold the NAACP liable under the circumstances.
22. [d. at 912 n.47. "a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; ifit furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." (quoting
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376-77 (1968».
23. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 920, (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960».
24. [d. at 915.
25. [d. at 916 n.50. "the rule is that we 'examine for ourselves the statements in
issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see ... whether they are
of a character which the principles of the First Amendment ... protect,'" (quoting
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331,335).
26. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530 (1980). The
Court invalidated a New York Public Service Commission order prohibiting public utility companies from placing inserts discussing public policy issues in monthly bills.
27. [d. at 535. Pacific Gas and Elec. CO. V. Public Utils. Comm'n. of California,
475 U.S. 1 (1986); Riley v. Nat'I. Fed'n. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); and Austin
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) are three recent cases which
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since the Public Service Commission admitted that its aim was
"to suppress certain bill inserts precisely because they address
controversial issues of public policy. "28
The Court rejected two arguments which would have limited the individual's right to speak when the state seeks to
impose subject matter restrictions on freedom of speech. To the
first, that the state may limit speech from certain sources, the
Court replied, "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend on the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union,
or individual."29 Second, the Court rejected the state suggestion
that speech may be restricted if an alternative avenue exists. 30
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, the Court
invalidated a Virginia statute which imposed criminal penalties for the disclosure of confidential information. 31 The state
contended that without a requirement of confidentiality such
as the statute imposed, the Judicial Inquiry and Review
Commission could not function properly; and that premature
disclosure of sensitive information presented an "immediate
threat to the orderly administration of justice. "32 Virginia
closely examine the second and third prongs of the analysis required by Consolidated
Edison, namely, whether the regulation in question is a content based restriction serving a compelling state interest.
28. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537.
29. Id. at 533 (quoting First Nat'l, Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978».
30. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 541 n.10: "Although a time, place, and manner restriction cannot be upheld without examination of alternative avenues of communication open to potential speakers, see Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. at 93, we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may
justify a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means
of expression. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. at 757 n.15; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975);
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 4ll n.4 (1974) (per curiam)."
In his dissent to Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, Justice Kennedy
observed, "That the avenue left open is more burdensome than the one foreclosed is
'sufficient to characterize [a statute] as an infringement on First Amendment activities.' (citations) As the Court reaffirmed just two Terms ago, '[t]he First Amendment
protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they
believe to be the most effective means for so doing.'" (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
at 424.) Austin, llO S. Ct. at 1423.
31. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1977). Landmark
was found guilty and fined under a Virginia statute for publishing an article reporting confidential information disclosed in an inquiry pending before the Virginia
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Id. at 831-32. There were injunctions and
restraining orders limiting several other media outlets in their coverage of the issue,
and another newspaper had been convicted of violation of the statute.
32. Id. at 833, (quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699,
712, 233 S.E.2d, at 129.)
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argued that confidentiality encourages the filing of complaints
by protecting witnesses from possible retaliation; protects
judges from injury caused by frivolous or unwarranted complaints; and generally assures confidence in the judiciary as an
institution by providing for orderly disclosure after groundless
claims have been weeded out by the inquiry process. 55
Accepting these state goals as permissible, the Court
inquired whether criminal sanctions are an appropriate tool for
insuring the confidentiality of the judicial inquiry process,34 and
concluded that the state interests advanced are insufficient to
justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. 56
The Court turned to the public interest in learning about
what Landmark published, and found that Landmark, in providing accurate information about the judicial inquiry, served
the interest in public scrutiny and discussion of government
that the first amendment was adopted to protect. 58 Since the
Virginia statute sought to punish speech so near the core of the
first amendment, the state interest in protecting judicial reputations from harm was an insufficient reason "for repressing
speech that would otherwise be free."57
In arguing for the necessity of confidentiality, Virginia
depended on a state legislative finding "that a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice would be
created by divulgence of the proceedings of the Commission. "38
33. ld. at 835.
34. ld. at 834, 837. While 47 states and the District of Columbia have confidentiality requirements, only Virginia and Hawaii provide criminal sanctions for disclosure. Only Maine, Mississippi, and Washington do nof appear on the list of states
having "some mechanism for inquiring into judicial disability and conduct" which
appears as an appendix to the opinion ofthe court at 846-848. The court suggested that
methods other than criminal sanctions might be effective in enforcing the confidentiality desired for the proceedings, pointing out that other states used oaths of secrecy and contempt proceedings to prevent participant disclosure. ld. at 841.
35. ld. at 838.
36. ld. at 839.
37. Id. at 842, (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73
(1954». Quoting from Justice Black's majority opinion in Bridges u. California and from
the dissent by Justice Frankfurter as well, the court noted, "'The assumption that
respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion'... Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
his dissent in Bridges, agreed that speech cannot be punished when the purpose is simply 'to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and spared the criticism to which in a
democracy other public servants are exposed,'" ld. at 842.
38. ld. at 843.
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The Court examined the ramifications of permitting the state
to override protections of the Bill of Rights by a general statement of legislative finding. 39 Before the Virginia Supreme
Court, Landmark had argued "before a state may punish
expression, it must prove by 'actual facts' the existence of a
clear and present danger to the orderly administration of
justice."4O The Court accepted that premise, noting that the
Virginia Supreme Court had relied on a legislative finding of
danger, but had found no actual danger. 41 The Court found
that the danger evidenced by the record was not clear and present, and that the activity the state sought to punish was precisely one "envisioned by the Founders in presenting the first
amendment for ratification. "43
The Landmark analysis has formed the basis for subsequent
cases challenging statutory limitations on a first amendment
right to disclose confidential information. Butterworth v. Smith
expanded the analysis to include the interest of the speaker in
disclosure. 43 Reporter Smith challenged a Florida statute prohibiting him from disclosing his own grand jury testimony. The
Court held that insofar as it prohibits a grand jury witness from
disclosing his own testimony, the Florida statute violates the
first amendment."
39. [d. at 843-45.
40. [d. at 843, (quoting Landmark, 217 Va. at 706, 233 S.E. 2d at 125).
41. [d. at 843-44. "Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry

when First Amendment rights are at stake ... A legislature appropriately inquires into
and may declare the reasons impelling legislative action bl!t the judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls within reach of the
statute and ifso whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution. Were it
otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be subject to legislative
definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on legislative power
would be nullified." [d.
42. [d. at 845, (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962». The question
before the court was whether Landmark and other press, as third persons who are
strangers to the judicial inquiry may be punished for divulging truthful information.
The court specifically reserved the question of whether witnesses or other participants,
including staff employees, may be punished for disclosing confidential information.
[d. at 837. See Butterworth, infra.
43. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990). Reporter Michael Smith testified before a Florida grand jury regarding improper behavior of certain public officials. He was warned that he could not disclose his grand jury testimony without
subjecting himself to criminal penalties under Florida's grand jury confidentiality
statute, which provided that disclosure may be ordered by the court for use "in the
defense or prosecution of the civil or criminal case and for no other purpose whatsoever." [d. at 1379. Since he wanted to report his investigation, including that portion
of it which formed his grand jury testimony, he filed suit seeking declaratory relief and
an injunction preventing the state from prosecuting him. [d.
44. [d. at 1379-80.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/13

8

Pagano: Constitutional Law

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

151

The Court reaffirmed its Landmark holding, linking its consideration of grand jury secrecy safeguards in Butterworth to
its former consideration of judicial inquiry rules by observing
the tension between First Amendment rights and "government investigatory proceedings. "46 Pointing out that Virginia
had "offered little more than assertion and conjecture" in support of 'its belief that criminal sanctions were necessary to
promote the objectives of its statutory scheme, the Court reasoned that Florida likewise was unable to show that its interests were served by the permanent ban on disclosure. 48
Finally, the Court examined Smith's interest in disclosure,
observing that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and similar rules in a majority of states did not
impose upon witnesses an obligation of secrecy with respect to
their own testimony.47 The Court concluded that the statute's
impact on Smith's ability to make a truthful statement on
matters of public importance is "dramatic."48 "[t]he ban extends
... into the indefinite future. The potential for abuse of the
Florida prohibition, through its employment as a device to
silence those who know of unlawful conduct or irregularities
on the part of public officials, is apparent. "49

Butterworth and Landmark both concern state statutes
prescribing criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. The Supreme Court has found the state
interests asserted insufficient to permit the burden that such
criminal sanctions impose on speech near the core of the first
amendment - the right of citizens to speak out and the right of
the public to know and discuss matters of public interest.

B. LIMITATIONS ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF
.GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
rejected the principle that a public employee must refrain
45. [d. at 1380.
46. [d. Florida's perjury and witness tampering statutes, and the Florida courts'
subpoena and contempt powers provide sufficient control over grand jury processes. "We
think the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best, and insufficient to outweigh the first amendment interest in speech involved". [d. at 1382.
47. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1382. The court found it not conclusive, but
probative of the weight to be assigned Florida's interests that the Advisory Committee
called the seal of secrecy "an unnecessary hardship (which) may lead to h\justice if a witness is not permitted to make a disclosure to counselor to an associate." [d. at 1383.
48. [d.
49. [d.
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from speaking out on matters of public interest, "which in the
absence of such position he would have an undoubted right to
engage in. "60 However, the state interest in regulating the
speech of its employees, arising from its interest in promoting
efficiency of the public services it performs, differs from its
interest in regulating the speech of the general public. The
Court declined to lay down a general standard for the regulation of the speech of public employees, but suggested that a balance must be struck between the employee interest in
commenting on a matter of public importance and the state
interest in promoting efficiency.61 Noting that an employee's
speech disclosing confidential matters or seriously undermining the effectiveness of working relationships might provide a permissible ground for dismissal, the Court reserved
those issues, intimating that those situations would involve different considerations from Pickering's plight. 62
Public employee speech which adversely affected working
relationships was the subject of Connick v. Meyers, where the
content of As.sistant District Attorney Myers's speech touched
on matters of both personal and public concern, and its form
and context dictated further analysis. 63 In a 5-4 decision, the
majority upheld the firing of Myers, finding that the first
amendment does not require an employer to tolerate action
which he believes will disrupt the office, undermine authority,
50. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968). Pickering was a teacher dismissed by the Board of Education for writing a letter to the newspaper criticizing
that Board's funding practices.
51. 1d. at 568.
52. 1d. at 570 n.3. Pickering did not disclose confidential information in his letter to the newspaper. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the Supreme
Court treated the issue of a government employee disclosing confidential information.
Snepp, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who had agreed not to
disclose classified information without authorization, was ordered by the Court to place
the profits from his book about the CIA in a constructive trust when the Court found
that he had published in violation of that agreement. Although Snepp attempted to
raise the issue of a prior restraint under the first amendment, the Court treated the
agreement as a fiduciary obligation well within the mandate of the CIA Director to
demand in the interests of national security. Courts have imposed strict limitations
on the disclosure of information classified as touching upon national security. See e.g.,
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063
(1972), where the court proposed standards accommodating both national security and
first amendment interests.
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). After Assistant District Attorney
Myers refused a transfer and circulated a questionnaire among fellow employees, her
superior, District Attorney Connick, fired her for insubordination and interfering with
working relationships. Examining the questionnaire in this context, the Court found
that it substantially reflected a personnel dispute and only tangentially touched on
a matter of public importance.
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and destroy close working relationships.54 The dissent found
that Myers's dismissal violated her first amendment rights as
a public employee because Connick had not shown that Myers's
speech had caused actual disruption, and because frequent
newspaper coverage ·of the events and personalities at the
District Attorney's office showed that Myers's speech was
about a matter of public concern. 55 Both majority and dissent,
though disagreeing on the interpretation of the facts of the case,
agreed that a public employee's rights to speak out on matters
of public concern should not be limited by a general rule, but
must be viewed in a factual context. 56
In another close decision, Rankin u. McPherson, the Court
upheld a public clerical worker's right to speak on matters of
public concern, reiterating the principle that a court must
examine the statement in its circumstances, but adding that the
state must bear the burden ofjustifying a discharge. 57 Balancing
Constable Rankin's interest in preserving discipline and efficiency in the workplace with McPherson's right to express a
political opinion in a private conversation, the Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals ruling that "however ill-considered" her
opinion was, it did not make her unfit for the job. 68
The Ninth Circuit has applied the factual tests of public concern and actual disruption set forth by the Supreme Court in
Pickering and Connick where a public employee has claimed
that his first amendment right to speak on matters of public
concern was violated by his dismissal, suspension, or transfer.
In Allen u. Scribner the court stated that the threshold inquiry
is whether the statements address a matter of public concern,
and that the content, form, and context of the speech at issue
will assist in that determination. 59 Criticism of government policy, competency, and efficiency which is purposefully directed
to the public rests on the "highest rung of the hierarchy of [f]irst
54. [d. at 154.
55. [d. at 160, n.2.
56. 1d. at 153, 157.
57. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). McPherson, a clerk in the
county Constable's office, was fired for a remark she made in a private conversation
with a co-worker as they listened to a radio report of the assassination attempt on
President Reagan, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." [d. at 388.
58. 1d. at 383.
59. Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d 426, 430 (9th Cir. 1987). The court reversed a summary judgment against plaintiff Allen, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he would have been transferred notwithstanding his first amendment
expression.
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[a]mendment values"60 because it brings to light an alleged
breach of public trust on the part of public officials.81 Second,
once the subject speech has been determined to address a
matter of public concern, the government must show that the
speech has caused actual disruption of the public services it performs. Potential disruption cannot "serve as a pretext for stifling legitimate speech or penalizing public employees for
expressing unpopular views. "82
The Ninth Circuit has recently added to the body oflaw surrounding the first amendment speech rights of government
employees in cases concerning dismissal or other job-related
retaliation. 8s In United States v. Richey, the Ninth Circuit
considered for the first time the criminal punishment of speech
on a matter of public concern by a present or former
government employee.
C.

ANALYSIS OF

TAX STATUTES

Before 1977, federal tax returns were public records; under
former 26 U.S.C. § 6103, decisions regarding individual
60. 1d. at 431, quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982),
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) and McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F. 2d
lll0, 111'4 (9th Cir. 1983).
61. 1d. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148).
62. 1d. at 432, (quoting McKinley, 705 F.2d at lll5).
63. The Ninth Circuit has applied a fact-driven analysis, eXamining whether the
sanctioned speech touched on a matter of public concern, and whether actual disruption
occurred in these cases:
In Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), a divided court, while
agreeing that the law is clearly established that public employees cannot be disciplined
solely for speaking out on matters of public interest, disagreed on the application of
the rule to the facts of that case.
In Burgess v. Pierce County, 918 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990), the court used the
Pickering. Connick analysis to rule that the question of whether a fire marshall's dismissal for speaking out against proposed fire ordinances was a retaliatory violation
of his first amendment right and not the result of disruption caused by his speech is
a question offact precluding summary judgment.
In Havekost v. United States Dep't. of the Navy, 925 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1991), the
court weighed Havekost's claim that her speech was about a matter of public interest, and not simply an employee grievance, against the fact that she made no attempt
to reach the general public in her speech activity. The Ninth Circuit found against
Havekost, citing Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 613, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1990) which stated
that actual communication with the press on an issue of some public interest might
indicate public speech. Havekost, 925 F.2d at 319.
In Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 3ll (9th Cir. 1991), the court denied first amendment relief to a whistleblower employed by the Veteran's Administration (VA) who
claimed that he was being harassed by his employers in retaliation for his speaking
out about VA malpractice. The court found that he had not exhausted his statutory
remedies under various federal acts designed to protect such interests 8S he claimed.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/13

12

Pagano: Constitutional Law

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

155

disclosure and disclosure policies were within the discretion of
the executive branch. 64 By 1974, the Internal Revenue Service
was disseminating the identifiable tax information of millions
of taxpayers annually to various government agencies. 66
Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 and created the
Privacy Protection Study Commission. Concerned that the
Privacy Act would not adequately protect the confidentiality of
tax returns, Congress in 1976 amended 26 U.S.C. § 6103 to provide that tax returns shall be confidential and not subject to disclosure except as provided by the statute. 66
In the eighteen subsections of section 6103, Congress
spelled out thirteen areas of allowable disclosure. 67 At the
same time, Congress revised 26 U.S.C. § 7213,68 increasing the
criminal penalty for an unauthorized disclosure, and created
a civil remedy for damages caused by willful or negligent disclosure under section 7217.69
64. M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 4-56 (2d ed. 1989).
65. Id. at 4-57. See also Benedict & Lupert, Federal Income Tax Returns - the
Tension between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 940
(1979).
66. 26 U.S.C. 6103(a). Section 6103, entitled "Confidentiality and disclosure of
returns and return information,· provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.
Returns and return information shall be confidential, and
except as authorized by this title(1) no officer or employee of the United States,
.. . shall disclose any return or return information
obtained by him in any manner in connection with his service as such an officer or an employee or otherwise or
under the provisions ofthis section. For purposes of this
subsection, the term ·officer or employee" includes a former officer or employee (emphasis added).
One of the factors which motivated Congress to change the fundamental posture
of the tax disclosure statute was the substantial amount of Watergate testimony which
revealed that President Nixon and the White House staff had allegedly attempted to
gain tax information and even initiate audits and investigations for political purposes.
Benedict & Lupert, supra note 65 at 942, n.5. The returns of Reverend Billy Graham,
actor John Wayne and Democratic National Chairman Lawrence O'Brien were
allegedly among those requested by the White House. Id. at 969.
67. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-57. "With respect to each of these areas, the committee has tried to balance the particular office or agency's need for the information
involved with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the disclosure upon
the continuation of compliance with our country's voluntary assessment system." Tax
Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, reprinted in 1976 u.s. CONGo & ADMIN NEWS at 3747.
68. 26 U.S.C. 7213, supra note 2. Congress substituted "willfully to disclose" for
"to disclose" in 1978.
69. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-58. Congress repealed section 7217 in 1982 and
replaced it with section 7431. The statutes are essentially the same.
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Thus it was against the backdrop of what Senator Weicker
referred to as the government "lending library" which circulated
millions of tax returns annually that Congress enacted the
stringent restrictions on disclosure that comprise section 6103
and its related penalty and remedial statutes. 70 The House of
Representatives and the Senate disagreed on whether disclosure situations should be inclusive or exclusive under the
statute. 71 The Senate version prevailed: all tax return information is confidential except for the specific permitted disclosures under the statute.
Section 6103 stands as a strong protection against the
indiscriminate dissemination of tax return information precisely because its provisions exclude disclosure, even against
the claims of laws such as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) designed to inform citizens of how personal information
gathered by the government is being used. 72 When section
6103 has been challenged by a request for disclosure under the
FOIA, it has been interpreted narrowly by the courts as a
statute that is non-discretionary; th,at is, it establishes particular criteria which have to be met before disclosure can
take place. 73 The IRS has argued that section 6103 blocks
access to individual tax return information requested under the
FOIA, and the courts have generally upheld the IRS position. 74
70. Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893, 894 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) quoting
Senator Wi ecker, "Over the years, a myriad of government agencies have gained
access to tax information of the IRS. De facto, IRS became a lending library ofconfidential tax information. As the Privacy Commission noted, information the IRS
maintained was treated as a 'generalized governmental asset,'" 122 CONGo REC.
24,013 (1976).
71. Tax Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CONGo & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3747. In the Senate version, the general rule is confidentiality. Tax return
information is not subject to disclosure "except in those limited situations delineated in the newly amended sections of6103 where the committee decided that disclosure
was warranted.
There is no comparable provision in the House bill." Id. (emphasis added).
72. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-58.
73. Id. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (FOIA), allows citizens
access to information gathered by the government. However, the Act contains nine
categories of information not generally available, including materials exempt by
statute from disclosure. Id. at 2-7, 2-11. The Internal Revenue Service has
successfully argued that section 6103 is the type of statute that exempts information
from disclosure because it is nondiscretionary under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3).Id. at 4-58.
74. Under section 6103 the IRS has refused to disclose tax information it has gathered about a taxpayer to the taxpayer himself, a use of probably not foreseen by
Congress. See e.g., Cliff V. Internal Revenue Service, 496 F. Supp. 568 S.D.N.Y.
(1980). In a suit under the FOIA by a tax attorney requesting that the IRS release internal memoranda and other documents for his use in advising a client, the court ruled
that disclosure was forbidden in part because the requested material was tax return
information under section 6103.Id. at 575 n.15.
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Section 6103 appears to have accomplished Congress's purpose in staunching the flow of tax information from the IRS, but
its interpretation in district and appellate courts has not been
uniform. Cases have centered around the issue of whether
the giving of tax information was a permitted "disclosure"
under the parameters of the statute. The circuit courts are split
on how narrowly section 6103 should be construed. The narrower view focusses on the agent's disclosure to discern that
there was a violation. 76 In contrast, the broader view assumes
that it is not possible for information which is already in the
See also, Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue Service, 484 U.S. 9 (1987)
where the Supreme Court interpreted the effect of the Haskell amendment on section
6103, but noted in passing that the parties agreed that -if section 6103 forbids the disclosure of material, it may not be produced in response to a request under the FOIA."
Id. at 11.
Whether tax information requested under the FOIA need be disclosed under the
prior version of section 6103 depended on the test of whether the party had placed
income at issue. In Association of Am. R.R. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C.
1974), the court ruled that although railroads must comply with Interstate Commerce
Commission requests for tax information, the FOIA did not require public disclosure
of this information. The court held th!lt since the railroads did not place their total
income in issue on the ICC forms, they had not waived their right to confidentiality.
Id. at 118.
75. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983) (disclosure of tax information in a court proceeding did not justify later disclosure absent express statutory
authorization).
In Chandler v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), the court granted a damage award under section 7431 to the taxpayer for an IRS agent's negligent
disclosure to the taxpayer's employer of tax return information, despite the IRS
claim that taxpayer had waived confidentiality by filing an injunctive suit against the
IRS.ld. at 1517, 1521. See also, Olsen v. Egger, 594 F. Supp. 644, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1984),
(quoted in Chandler, 687 F. Supp. at 1518. (prior use of tax return information in a
state court action to recover alimony and child support did not constitute a waiver of
confidentiality. The court pointed out that such waivers were common abuses under
the statutes prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and that the revised statute does not
permit the court to create judicial exceptions to the general prohibition against disclosure.» Id.
In Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986) a taxpayer sued the IRS
for damages from disclosure after the IRS issued a press release outlining tax evasion
charges against Johnson and stating that he had pleaded guilty and been convicted.
Although the IRS had agreed not to disclose Johnson's tax evasion case as part of the
settlement agreement, IRS guidelines permitted the issue of press releases disclosing convicted tax evaders as a means of publicizing the enforcement of tax law, and
the information was released in a routine office practice. The court, in a thorough analysis of section 6103, found no language which would permit such a press release. Id.
at 1133. In a note which has been quoted in Lampert v. United States 854 F.2d 335,
337 (9th Cir. 1988), the court stated the crux of the dilemma caused by strict interpretation of section 6103:
-This court recognizes that its strictly enforcing the comprehensive regulation of
§ 6103 greatly hampers the government's ability to issue press releases concerning the
prosecution oftax evaders. If that result is poor public policy, it is for Congress - not
the Courts - to amend § 6103 to allow the issuing of such releases." Johnson, 640 F.
Supp. at 1133 n.18.
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public record to be a "disclosure."76 In addition, some circuits
allow disclosures under the rubric of "tax administration."77
The Sixth Circuit declined to find unauthorized disclosure
where there was no nexus between the data disclosed and the
furtherance of obligations controlled by Title 26. 78 Similarly,
where the disclosure of tax information was incidental to disclosure of information that a taxpayer had invoked the Fifth
Amendment, the Tenth Circuit found that there was no nexus
between that non-tax activity disclosed and the taxpayer's
obligation to pay taxes. Thus, federal agents' limited disclosures
were permissible in the context of the case they were pursuing. 79
76. See discussion of Ninth, Circuit cases, infra notes 80-92 and accompanying
text.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(b)(4). Subsection (b), entitled "definitions" has ten paragraphs of which "Tax Administration" subsection (4)(A) means(i) the administration, management, conduct, direction, and
supervision of the execution and application of the internal
revenue laws or related statutes ... and
(B) includes assessment, collection, enforcement, litigation, publication, and statistical gathering functions
under such laws, statutes, or conventions.
See also, Rueckert v. IRS 775 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1985). The Illinois Department
of Revenue has a rule forbidding its agents from engaging in outside employment.
Finding evidence in agent Rueckert's state tax return that he might be doing so, Illinois
requested and received his federal return to establish his sources of income, and reprimanded him for pursuing outside employment on the basis of that return information. Rueckert sued the IRS, alleging that its disclosure of his tax return information
to Illinois violated his right to confidentiality. Finding no case law on the specific question, the court reviewed the legislative history and wording of section 6103, focussing
particularly on § 6103(d) permitting disclosure to state agencies for tax administration, and § 6103(b)(4), definition of tax administration. Finding the definition of tax
administration "so sweeping as to compel rejection of restrictive interpretation" the
court denied Rueckert's claim. Rueckert, 775 F.2d at 211, (quoting Unites States v.
Mangan, 575 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (l978). Accord Davidson v.
Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mich. 1983), affd. on other grounds, 732 F.2d 552 (6th
Cir. 1984), (quoted in Rueckert, 775 F.2d at 211.) (Where Davidson's tax return was
disclosed in another man's federal judicial proceeding pertaining to tax administration, the disciosure was authorized under the tax administration exception.) Rueckert,
775 F.2d at 211.
78. In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), petition
for reh'g. denied, 696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982). The nexus test depends on an interpretation of § 6103(bX2), the definition of return information. The court in In Re Grand
Jury found that an IRS agent's disclosure to the United States attorney that defendant Jackson had threated potential witnesses against him in a grand jury investigation of irregularities in his tax returns was not "return information." Finding that
the information was related to an obstruction of justice violation, and had nothing to
to with tax irregularities, the court rejected Jackson's claim that the disclosure was
just cause for him to refuse to comply with the grand jury SUbpoena. Id.
79. First W. Gov't. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356, 359-60 (lOth Cir.
1986) (IRS disclosure that taxpayer had invoked the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was not return information.)
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Within the Ninth Circuit, at both the district court level and
in the Court of Appeals, courts have given a broad reading to
section 6103, finding that the tax information disclosed had
already lost its confidential status, and denying damages to the
complaining taxpayer.80 In 1985, United Energy Corporation
was denied damages under 26 U.S.C. § 7431 for unauthorized
disclosure to the press under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(h)(4)(C).81 The
court held that when a United States Attorney merely
answered questions asked by a reporter about a complaint
filed by United Energy against the IRS, his statements confirming that the IRS was investigating United Energy were not
a disclosure of confidential tax information; by filing its complaint asking the court to stop the investigation, United Energy
was held to have "lost any entitlement to privacy in that
information. "82
.In 1987, the Ninth Circuit set forth a baseline interpretation of section 6103 in Stokwitz v. United States. The court ruled
that an unauthorized search of Stokwitz's office and briefcase, and seizure of his personal copies of his tax returns by his
supervisor and secretary, both government employees, was
not a disclosure forbidden under section 6103. 83 The court reasoned that the statute must be read as a whole; that its purpose was to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of tax
information actually filed with the IRS, and that copies were
80. United Energy Corp. v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. Cal. 1985);
Stokwitz v. United States 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987); and Lampert v. United
States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988).
81. United Energy, 622 F. Supp. at 45. The court quotes section 6103(h)(4)(C)
authorizing the disclosure of return information "in a Federal or State judicial proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but only ... if such return or return information directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party
to the proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in
the proceeding.~ 6103(h)(4)(c).
The Tenth and Sixth Circuits have also extended the range of permissible disclosure under § 6103 (h)(4)(C) to include disclosure to the press and other interested
parties, even though there is no specific § 6103 exception permitting such disclosure.
In 1986, the Tenth Circuit held that the statutory language did not specifically limit
itselfto disclosures made to federal officials, thus the section applied to disclosures
made to anyone. Note, Meaning of-Return Information- within Internal Revenue Code
Section 6103 and When Return Information May Be Disclosed by the Internal Revenue
Service under Section 6103 (h)(4), 65:4 DEN. U.L. REV. 646. The Note discusses First
Western Government Securities v. United States, 796 F. 2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986). Accord
Davidson v. Brady, 559 F. Supp. 456 (W.O. Mich, 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 552 (6th Cir.
1984); Note, Meaning at 649 n.95.
82. United Energy, 622 F. Supp. at 46.
83. Stokwitz, 831 F.2d at 894. The court suggested that Stokwitz's more appropriate remedy was the Bivens action he had also filed against his employer. Id.
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not covered by the statute.1U Quoting from the legislative history, the court found that Congress's overriding purpose was
to curtail loose disclosure practices by the IRS, and abuse by
government agencies of information filed with the IRS.86 The
court read the elaborate disclosure procedures codified in section 6103 as establishing a "comprehensive scheme for controlling the release by the IRS of information ... That is as far
as the statute goes ... There is no indication in either the
language of section 6103 or its legislative history that Congress
intended to enact a general prohibition against public disclosure of tax information"86 (emphasis in original). Such an
interpretation would be excessively burdensome, since
"[slection 6103 was not designed to provide the only means for
obtaining tax information; it simply provides the only means
for acquiring such information from the IRS. "87
In Lampert v. United States, the Ninth Circuit expanded on
the reasoning in United Energy Corp. and Stokwitz, holding
that "once return information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial
forum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not
violate" section 6103. 88 The court surveyed the cases holding for
strict interpretation of section 6103, disagreeing with Rodgers
u. Hyatt and Johnson v. Sawyer which had held that press
releases concerning tax information already in the public
record were an unauthorized disclosure. 89 Rejecting the argument that for a government employee to disclose any return
information, confidential or not, there must exist an applicable exception to 6103, the court stated, "Only a strict
84. [d.
85. [d. at 894-95.
86. [d. at 895-96.
87. Stokwitz, 831 F.2d at 897. The court points out that if a government
employee obtained tax information by subpoena, discovery, or other appropriate way
and subsequently disclosed that information, the government would be liable for
civil or criminal penalties if section 6103 procedures were the only avenue for disclosure.
88. Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988). Three cases were
consolidated for appeal to the Ninth Circuit: Lampert u. United States, Figur u.
United States, and Peinado u. United States. The court affirmed the district court's holding in each that press releases related to tax proceedings were not unauthorized disclosures. The United States Attorney issued press releases summarizing tax evasion
charges against Figur; issued two press releases in Peinado, one announcing that he
had pleaded guilty to tax evasion, and another revealing his sentence. In Lampert, the
government sought an injunction against Lampert's promotion and sale of abusive tax
shelters; both the United States Attorney and the IRS issued press releases on that
case.
89. [d. at 337. See also discussion of Rodgers u. Hyatt and Johnson u. Sawyer,
supra note 75.
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technical reading of the statute supports [this] position. "90
The court opined that such a reading would defeat the purposes
of the statute, and greatly hamper the government's ability to
publicize the prosecution of tax evaders.91 The court concluded that once tax return information is lawfully disclosed in
court proceedings, the 6103 directive to keep the information
confidential is moot. 92
III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether former
Internal Revenue agent Lawrence M. Richey's prosecution
and conviction for his disclosure to the press of tax information
violated his first amendment right to freedom of expression. 93
The court first observed that the government may properly
limit speech when compelling government interests outweigh
the interests of the speaker. 94 The court next identified the
interests at stake: Richey's interest in a fair trial, which
includes the right to have an unbiased judge;95 his interest as
a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern, and
the related interest of the public in being informed about matters of public concern;96 and the interest of the government in
protecting the confidentiality of tax information. 97 The court
then balanced Richey's and the public's interests against those
of the government and found that "Richey's self-serving comments to the press ... are not transmogrified into speech
worthy of first amendment protection simply because they
touched upon a matter of public concern. "98
90. [d. at 338.
91. [d. The court quotes the footnote from John.son. v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp.
1126,1133 n.18, quoted supra note 75. The underlying reasoning is that since one of
the main purposes of section 6103 was to restore taxpayer confidence in the IRS, a prohibition of press releases showing that tax evaders were being prosecuted (hence, the
system was being operated fairly) would defeat that goal..
92. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
93. United States v. Richey 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991). The majority opinion
was written by O'Scannlain, Circuit Judge, joined by Wright, J. The dissent was written by Reinhardt, J. who had been a member oflhe panel deciding Stokwitz v. United
States, 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 1033 (1988). See supra notes
70, 82-87 and accompanying text.
94. [d. at 859. The court cites Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 841 (1978) for this proposition. However the statement does not appear in
that case.
95. Richey, 924 F.2d at 859.
96. [d. at 860. The court identifies the matter of public concern as potential judicial bias, and the public interest in the operation of the courts. [d.
97. [d. at 861.
98. [d. at 863.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 13

162

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:143

The court first examined Richey's interest in a fair trial,
including the right to have an unbiased judge. Assuming for the
purposes of the appeal that Richey had a colorable claim of
potential bias by Judge McDonald, the court found Richey's
interest "substantial. "99
The majority and the dissent disagreed over the nature of
Richey's interest in making the statements at issue. This basic
difference influenced their respective treatments of the constitutional question. 1°O The dissent argued that Richey's interest was
not in obtaining a fair trial, but "in publicizing the facts relating to his allegedly unfair treatment" in his completed trial. 101
Richey's claims had two legal grounds: whether Judge McDonald
violated the recusal statute by presiding over Richey's trial, 102
99. Richey, 924 F.2d at 859. The court allowed Richey's claim of bias to stand since
the disclosure at issue occurred in October, 1987, while his conviction for conspiracy
to defraud the IRS was on appeal (notice filed July 10, 1987 [USDC Eastern District
of Washington Docket No. CR-85-169-1, hereinafter, Docket CR-85-169-1]) to the
Ninth Circuit on that ground among others. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1989)(memorandum disposition).
On May 5, 1989, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the "odd provision in his sentence
(now eradicated) requiring him not to criticize the government of the United S[tjates
... while not defensible, does not bespeak prejudice." (mem. at 4-5).
Richey was joined by the ACLU in arguing that the provision violated his first
amendment rights. Since Richey'S disclosures had triggered a probation revocation
hearing December 8,1988 in which a different judge removed the restraining provisions (and also changed the prison sentence from 45 years to 15 counts of3 years each,
running concurrently)(Docket CR-85-l69-H), the court termed the issue moot.
The test for mootness set forth in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539,546-547 (1976), "capable of repetition, yet evading review," was interpreted by
the court as follows: "There has been no showing that Richey is in danger of being resentenced to hold his tongue," (mem. at 12) a reading at odds with the Supreme Court's
explication of the rule, since the phrase "capable of repetition" refers to any future
abuse, not just one involving the same party. Nebraska, 427 U.S. at 546-547. The Ninth
Circuit reading would not recognize a showing that any judge might in the future
impose a similar penalty on any defendant.
100. The court viewed Richey's interest as a due process interest in gaining a fair
trial, and in that context found Richey's comments to the press disruptive, and the relationship between his statements and that interest tenuous. Richey, 924 F.2d at 85960 n.2, 862 n.6, and 867 n.6.
"In contrast to the government's 'compelling' interest, Richey'S personal interest
in having an unbiased judge preside at his trial could hardly be advanced by his gratuitous remarks to the media, particularly given they were made after the trial." [d.
at 862. Consequently, Richey's remedy was through the appellate process.
In contrast, the dissent viewed Richey's right to appellate review irrelevant to his
exercise of his first amendment right to criticize the district court for its conduct of
his prior trial. [d. at 868.
101. Richey, 924 F.2d at 867 n.6.
102. The dissent argued that despite the Ninth Circuit ruling (Richey, 874 F.2d
817 memorandum) rejecting Richey's claim that the judge should have recused himself sua sponte, the test required by 28 U.S.C. 455, supra note 6, and interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health Servo Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847 (1988),
involves the appearance of bias, as well as actual bias. Richey, 924 F.2d at 865.
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and whether the judge's conduct was unfair and prejudicia1. 103
The dissent pointed out that people have a first amendment
right to criticize the judiciary when they believe a wrong has
occurred. 104
The court next considered Richey's interest, as a citizen, in
commenting on matters of public concern. Citing Landmark,
the court stated that potential judicial bias is clearly a matter
of public concern, "which Richey had a cognizable interest in
discussing. "105 The court agreed that the public interest in
being informed must be considered in any first amendment calculus. 106 However, the court observed that the public interest
in being informed carries less weight in the balancing process
when invoked by persons privy to sensitive materials. 107
Turning to the government interest in protecting the confidentiality of tax information, the court found that confidentiality is necessary to ensure compliance with federal tax laws,
and that the government also asserts a privacy interest on
behalf of its citizens. lOB
Next the court balanced the government interest in maintaining a workable tax system with Richey's interest, which it
The dissent pointed to the language of section 455(a), that a judge ·shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
As long as a reasonable person might question the ability of a judge to be impartial
in the tax fraud case ofa man who had audited his returns, the statute applies. Richey,
924 F.2d at 868 n.9.
103. Richey, 924 F.2d at 868. The dissent found that the judge's conduct in presiding over the trial, and in imposing sentence which included the "wholly unprecedented and unconstitutional gag order" provoked Richey's compelling interest in
bringing his complaint to the public's attention. [d. at 871, 868.
104. [d. at 868. See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) "Comment after the imposition of sentence - criticism, however unrestrained, of its severity or lenience ... -is an exercise or the right of free discussion.
Bridges, 314 U.S. at 300 .
. 105. Richey, 924 F.2d at 860.
106. [d.
107. [d. at 860-861. The court cites Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,
435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978) pointing out that the Supreme Court disavowed taking a position on the constitutionality of punishing ·participants" for breach of the confidentiality
mandate. [d. at 861.
The dissent rejects the court's argument as having no support in the law, since
the Supreme Court expressly declined to address the question of whether a disclosure
of confidential information by a participant, staff member, or witness, rather than by
a third party would lead to a different outcome. [d. at 867. See also, Butterworth v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1377 (1990) (statute forbidding disclosure of grand jury testimony
by a witness unconstitutional).
108. Richey, 924 F.2d at 861.
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identified as a remedial interest in having an unbiased judge
preside at his trial. 109 The court characterized the government
interest as "compelling,""O and found that it outweighed
Richey's personal interest in having an unbiased judge, since
his comments to the press would have no effect on the judicial
process. lll
Weighing the government interest against Richey's interest as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern,
the court quoted several cases which discuss limitations to a
public employee's right to comment on such matters.ll2
Concluding that the government's interest permits restrictions on disclosures, the court found Richey's interest
109. [d. at 862.
110. [d. The court quoted Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir.

1987) for the proposition that the government interest in maintaining a workable tax
system is "compelling." Bradley made a first amendment challenge to an IRS provision forbidding the filing of "frivolous" tax returns when he was fined $500 for filing
a return which contained only his identifying information and a statement condemning United States policy in Central America.
.
The dissent pointed out that the "compelling" government interest the Bradley
court found to outweigh Bradley's first amendment claim was its interest in the filing of accurate tax returns. "To hold otherwise would frustrate Congress's intent to
reduce the administrative burden on the IRS from handling forms which are not in
processible form." Bradley, 817 F.2d at 1404. The Bradley court considered Bradley's
conduct in filing as well as the speech component, quoting the O'Brien standard, "when
'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech elements can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Bradley, 817 F.2d at 1405,
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968».
The dissent stated that by relying on Bradley, the court "improperly trivializes"
Richey's free speech rights. Richey, 924 F.2d at 870 n.13.
111. See discussion supra n.100.
112. Richey, 924 F.2d at 862. The dissent pointed out that none of the cases
cited by the court supports the conclusion that the IRS interest permits suppression of Richey's speech. As presented, they provide illustrations of the principle that
the speech of public employees may be limited under some circumstances. [d. at 869
n.10.
E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) concerned an unconstitutional time,
place, and manner restriction, and an overbroad statute; Allen v. Scribner, 812 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1987) held that a bare assertion that an employee's speech would interfere with efficient government operation cannot support limiting that speech; Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) upheld a limitation on an employee's speech which was
reasonably likely to disrupt the office where the subject speech was of limited public
concern; Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) concerned national security, an
area where the Supreme Court has established special guidelines. Richey, 924 F.2d
at 869 n.10.
The court cited United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1989) in support
of the related point that the availability of the disclosed information elsewhere does
not ease a restriction on speech. Richey 924 F.2d at 863 n.7. However, Posey, like Snepp,
is a case involving the national security interest.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol22/iss1/13

22

Pagano: Constitutional Law

1992]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

165

insufficient to outweigh that of the state.1l3 Therefore, the
court affirmed the conviction.1l4
THE DISSENTING OPINION

The dissent opened by describing Richey's "odyssey" through
the courts as a sad chapter in the history of the Ninth Circuit
where twice his first amendment rights were violated with the
active participation of a judiciary unable to grasp the importance of freedom of speech when it involved criticism of the judiciary.115 Casting the issue in terms of the public's right to know
of judicial conflicts of interest, the dissent noted the irony
that Richey was convicted for exercising his free speech rights
by explaining why he believed a federal judge had imposed an
order flagrantly violating those rights. 116
Considering first the limitations on the speech of public
employees, the dissent applied the Pickering-Connick test,
finding in answer to the first prong of the test, that Richey's
speech was on a matter of public concern.l17 The dissent found
that Richey's speech was about judicial bias, and "[t]he operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are
matters of utmost public concern. "118 His responses to reporters'
questions touched on tax information relevant to Richey's
claim that the judge should have recused himself.119
113. Richey, 924 F.2d at 863 n.7. "Moreover, public confidence in the tax system
is less likely to erode if disclosure is made during the course of a judicial proceeding,
rather than at the whim of a former IRS agent. Richey's ofiband comments to the press
suggest to the public that no restrictions of such information exist." Id.
114. Id. at 863. Since they considered the substance of Richey's speech to be disclosure of tax information, the court did not consider the public interest in learning
of judicial bias, and thus did not consider the nexus argument, although they cited In
Re Grand Jury Investigation, 696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982) in dismissing Richey's argument for dismissal of government counsel for disclosure of McDonald's tax information.
115. Id. at 863. The court characterizes the dissenting opinion as "strident emotional rhetoric." Id. at 859 n.2.
116. Id. at 865.
117. Richey, 924 F.2d at 866. See Pickeringv. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563 (1968);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The dissent pointed out that the public interest that arose in Richey's case was in itself evidence that he spoke on a matter of public concern. In addition, the dissent observed that if law did not require Judge
McDonald to recuse himself under the circumstances of Richey's case, Richey might
have had an even more compelling justification for making his charges to the press
in order to encourage reform of the rules. Richey, 924 F.2d at 869.
118. Id. at 866. (Quoting Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 839 (1978 at 866».
119. Id. Richey supported his allegation with specific facts, maintained the dissent, quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457,458 (D.C.Cir.) cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942) "The protection
of the public requires not merely discussion, but information." Richey, 924 F.2d at 871.
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The second prong of the test, balancing the free speech
interest against the asserted government interest, involves a
factual inquiry into the context and circumstances of the
speech. Where a first amendment interest is asserted, the
Constitution requires the court to assess the particular harm
to the individual and the general harm which would result to
society from the suppression of the statement at issue. 12o
The dissent agreed that the government has a weighty
interest in maintaining a workable tax system and in protecting the confidentiality of tax information. 121 The dissent nevertheless found that the first amendment protected Richey's
comments criticizing the conduct of the court, a matter of public concern. 122 The dissent observed that the public interest in
learning about governmental wrongdoing depends on the
nature of the information, not the identity of its source. 123
Moreover, the dissent continued, in criminal proceedings,
there is a great need for public accountability, as openness discourages "decisions based on secret bias or partiality."12'
Openness is particularly important where a recusal issue has
arisen in the context of a criminal trial, since public confidence
in the courts is essential to the community. "[T]he appearance
of justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it."l25
Th,e dissent concluded that the balance weighed in favor of
the public interest in learning of judicial bias and against the
injury to the tax system that might result from a disclosure that
a judge had once been audited. 126 Finally, the dissent observed
that the only harm to the taxpayer was the premature disclosure of a small amount oftax information, which under the rulings of the Ninth Circuit would have been in the public record
120. Richey, 924 F.2d at 870. See also Bridges, 314 U.S. at 293.
121. Richey, 924 F.2d at 867. Citing Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335 (9th
Cir. 1988) and Stokwitz v. United States, 831 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485
U.S. 1033 (1988).
122. Richey, 924 F.2d at 865.
123. Id. at 867. See also, First Nat'1. Bank v. Belotti. 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (inherent worth of speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source).
124. Richey. 924 F.2d at 869 n.ll (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980».
125. Richey, 924 F.2d at 869 n.11 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at
571-72). See also, Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.)
126. Richey, 924 F.2d 870 n.13. The disclosure was inconsequential compared to
the disclosures judges must make under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,2 U.S.C. § 701
et seq. (Transferred to 5 U.S.C. 101-112 Nov. 30, 1989). Richey, 924 F.2d at 871 n.14.
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shortly after Richey's statement to the press. 127 In contrast, the
harm to Richey is the deprivation of his free speech right, or
criminal sanction if he exercises that right.
Summarizing the three preeminent factors-that bias on
the bench involves a breach of public trust, that an individual who believes he is a victim of judicial bias should not be
silenced by the state, and that the actual disclosure was minimal-the dissent found that Richey's speech was protected by
the first amendment. 128 Therefore, the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Richey.129
IV.

COMMENT

The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Richey decided that
26 U.S.C. § 7213, a statute prescribing penalties for unauthorized disclosure of tax information, was not unconstitutional as applied to Richey-that his speech was not "worthy
of first amendment protection" and that the district court did
not err in denying the motion to dimiss the indictment on
first amendment grounds. 130
This comment rests on two premises: first, that the court
might have avoided the constitutional issue by looking to its
own precedent in interpreting the statute and granting Richey's
motion to dismiss or deciding the case on statutory ground.
Second, having declined to interpret the statute as permitting
Richey's disclosure, the court should have employed the dissent's constitutional analysis as the more accurate interpretation of the constitutional question.
A

THE ,ApPLICATION OF THE STATUTE

Richey argued three iss.ues on appeal: whether the trial
court should have granted the motion to dismiss; whether the
127. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871. The dissent bases this on the fact that Richey had
already appealed his conviction when he made his statements to the press. One of the
grounds he argued on appeal was the recusal issue. United States v. Richey, 874 F.2d
817 (9th Cir. 1989)(memorandum disposition).
In Brief for Appellant at 2, United States v. Richey 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991),
Richey asserts that at the sentencing hearing for his false tax return conviction on June
19, 1987, "Judge McDonald was indirectly reminded by counsel of his connection with
Appellant." Brief at 2. If this is a matter of public record as part of the sentencing hearing, Richey's case would fall squarely under Lampert.
128. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871.
129. 1d.
130. 1d. at 863.
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trial court should have granted the motion for removal of
counsel; and whether [Richey's] disclosure of his audit of Judge
McDonald was protected by the first amendment. 131 The Ninth
Circuit in its opinion considered only the constitutional question and did not take up the issue of a motion to dismiss under
the statute. 132 However, under existing Ninth Circuit precedent,
as well as authority from other circuits, Richey's case might
have been dismissed or decided on statutory grounds.
First, the Ninth Circuit held in Lampert that "once return
information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial forum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not violate" 26 U.S.C .
. 6103. 133 In October 1987, when he made the statements for
which he was convicted, Richey had already filed his notice of
appeal with the district court. Moreover, the controversial
sentence including the "gag order" was already a matter of public record, having been filed July 6, 1987. 134 It can be argued
under Lampert that the disclosure was already a part of the
public record of judicial proceedings, since the basic events upon
which Richey would argue his appeal had already taken place,
and it was only the details which awaited disclosure. Richey's
appeal could not have been argued without the disclosure,
and Richey in fact disclosed less than what eventually was
revealed. 135
Second, under the nexus test used by the Sixth Circuit, the
disclosure of information concerning a possible obstruction of
justice was not considered to be disclosure of "return information," even where the communication included an
131. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1991).
This comment is not concerned with the argument for removal of counsel, which the
court dismissed. Richey, 924 F.2d. at 863.
132. The Supreme Court has put forth guidelines for avoiding constitutional
issues when possible; among them, the Court will not pass on a constitutional question, even when it is properly presented, where some other ground is present, such as
a statute, upon which the case may be decided. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
133. Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. The charge against Richey for violating 26
U.S.C. § 7213 depends upon the terms ofsection 6103 for its application. There is no
case law interpreting section 7213.
134. United States District Court, Eastern District, Washington Docket CR-85169-1, Sentence or probation order, July 6, 1987. The sentence totalled 45 years, at
three years for each of fifteen counts, suspended. Richey was placed on probation for
five years, on condition, among others, that Richey "abstain from making any derogatory statements against the Government." [d.
135. Brief for Appellant at 3, United States v. Richey, 924 F.2d 857 (1991)
states that the United States Attorney revealed the amount of additional tax and the
tax years involved in Richey's audit of Judge McDonald.
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incidental disclosure of tax information. ISS The court in In Re
Grand Jury did not construe the strict protections of the
statute as disabling IRS employees from reporting a taxpayer's
criminal conduct unrelated to his IRS obligations. 1s7 One may
apply this reasoning to Richey's allegation of judicial bias,
which was accompanied by the incidental disclosure of tax
information as explanation for the alleged bias. Although
Richey did not allege criminal conduct on the part of the judge,
his allegations were serious, implying a breach of the public
trust.
Third, under the broad definition of "tax administration" followed by several circuits, a court could find Richey's disclosure
permissible. l38 Rueckert provides the closest parallel to Richey's
situation, where a disclosure pursuant to investigating a conflict
of interest was found to be authorized under 26 U.S.C. 6103. 1S9
A judge has not hitherto been considered a party to tax
administration proceedings for purposes of subsections
6103(b)(4) or 6103(h)(4). However, under section 6103(h)(5) the
defendant in a criminal case may inquire whether a prospective juror has been audited. 140 In United States v. Hashimoto,
the Ninth Circuit held that failure of the IRS to respond to this
request resulted in reversible error based on a significant risk
of prejudice. 141 In view of this holding, and the fact that the relevant tax information of any party to the case may be disclosed
under 6103(h)(4), it seems illogical that a judge should be
excused from similar scrutiny if significant risk of prejudice is
to be avoided. 142
Finally, the Richey court, in arguing for the taxpayer's
right to privacy cited Association for American Railroads. 14s
136. In Re Grand Jury Investigation, 688 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1982). When the
IRS informed the United States attorney that the taxpayer was threatening witnesses,
they.incidentally disclosed that they were investigating him. The court held this not
to violate § 6103.
137. Id. at 1071.
138. 26 U.S.C. 6103(b)(4) and 6103(h)(4). See supra note 78 and accompanying
text.
139. Rueckert v. Internal Revenue Service, 775 F.2d 208 (1985).
140. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (h)(5).
141. SALTZMAN, supra note 64 at 4-71 n.70 (ciling United States v. Hashimoto,
878 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982).
142. Indeed, it is possible that the Judge's tax information is a matter of public
record under the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, supra n.126. Irso, Richey's case would
qualify for summary judgment in his favor.
143. Richey, 924 F.2d at 861.
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While it is true that that case stands for the proposition that
a taxpayer's right to privacy may not be breached by disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act, the holding rests on the
condition that the taxpayer had not placed his income "at
issue," since in doing so, the taxpayer waives his right to confidentiality.l" It can be argued that Judge McDonald placed his
tax information in issue by his conduct in not recusing himself
and in imposing a draconian sentence on the man he knew had
audited that information.

B.

FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

If a .court rejects the argument that Richey's disclosure
was authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and thus not subject
to the criminal penalties under section 7213, then it must
consider the constitutional challenge, weighing the statute
against the first amendment right asserted.

Section 7213 is a subject matter restriction on speech,
imposing criminal penalites for its violation. 146 Where the
exercise of protected speech is subject to criminal prosecution, the statute is subject to heightened scrutiny.l46 Moreover,
a tax provision which imposes a penalty is to be construed
strictly; the government must meet its burden of proving all the
elements of the violation. 147 In Richey's case, the government
needed to argue and prove that Richey violated each element
of the statute. But the government did not meet its burden;
Richey simply admitted making the statement. Given the
wide variations in interpretation of the terms of the statute, the
court found itselfin the unenviable constitutional situation of
weighing a conviction under a federal statute whose terms
have occasioned disagreement among the courts as to what constitutes its violation, without adequate argument from either
side on that issue.

Landmark held that "before a state may punish expression,
it must prove by actual facts the existence of a clear and
present danger to the orderly administration of justice. "148
144. Association of Am. R.R. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D.D.C. 1974).
145. 26 U.S.C. § 7213, supra note 2.
146. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) "a governmentally imposed penalty for the exercise of protected speech is sufficiently like direct suppression to trigger heightened First
Amendment scrutiny." ld. at 29.
'
147. Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1402-1403 (9th Cir. 1987).
148. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 843.
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The Landmark Court emphasized that a legislative finding of
possible danger is no substitute for a judicial analysis of the
statute as applied. Were it otherwise, the court explained,
the first amendment as a check on legislative power would be
nullified. 149 In Richey's case, there was no showing of actual
harm, only the invocation of the sentiments occasioned by the
situation which inspired the enactment of the statute in the
first place. Richey's statement, in the context of his posture as
a criminal defendant appealing his conviction, in no way raises the spectre of executive abuse which spawned the statute's
elaborate protections.
The constitutional balance does not change when Richey is
considered as a former public employee. Whether citizen or former public employee, he has a right, as the dissent states, to
speak out if he believes he is the victim of judicial bias. 160 The
question becomes whether what he says may be limited.
Restrictions on what former IRS agents and other government
employees may disclose are necessary to protect the government's
interest in the orderly administration of tax laws, the system of
voluntary disclosure, and the confidentiality of individual tax
information. However, a statute which will not permit disclosure
under circumstances of criminal defense, except under the most
technical reading, proves a trap for the unwary, and where
freedom of speech is the price to be paid, the statute has exceeded constitutional bounds. 161 As the Court in Butterworth pointed out, such a restriction on disclosure is permanent, dramatic
in its effect, and subject to abuse by persons in power. 162

Christine C. Pagano*
149. See supra, note 41 and accompanying text.
150. Richey, 924 F.2d at 871.
151. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every indio
vidual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803) (quoted in, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed'!.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971».
If Richey had obeyed the statute and not spoken to the press, this is what probably would have happened. The Ninth Circuit would not have changed its finding of
no bias in the judge's conduct, since it did not consider the gag order a sign of bias. The
court probably would have lifted the gag order. Then instead of being deprived of his
constitutional right to criticize the government for the few months he endured that
sanction before he broke his silence, Richey would have had two years of court
ordered silence before the decision of the Ninth Circuit lifted it. Of course, if the Ninth
Circuit affirmed his conviction and found no constitutional insult in the condition of
probation, Richey would be effectively silenced until July 1992, observing the 200th
anniversary of the Bill of Rights by not criticizing the judge who sentenced him or the
Ninth Circuit which affirmed that conviction in an unpublished memorandum.
152. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (1990).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1993.
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